This paper departs from John Roemer's theory of equality of opportunities. We seek to determine what part of observed outcome inequality may be attributed to differences in observed 'circumstances', including family background, and what part is due to 'personal efforts'. We use a micro-econometric technique to simulate what the distribution of outcomes would look like if 'circumstances' were the same for everybody. This technique is applied to Brazilian data from the 1996 household survey, both for earnings and for household incomes. It is shown that observed circumstances are a major source of outcome inequality in Brazil, probably more so than in other countries for which information is available. Nevertheless, the level of inequality after observed circumstances are equalized remains very high in Brazil.
Introduction
Inequality of "outcomes" and inequality of "opportunities" have long been associated with very different views on social justice, in the literature on economic inequality. The first of these concepts refers to the distribution of the joint product of the efforts of a person and the particular circumstances under which this effort is made. It is mostly concerned with income inequality.
The second concept refers to the heterogeneity in those circumstances that lie beyond the control of the individual, but that nevertheless significantly affect the results of his efforts, and possibly the levels of those efforts themselves. This distinction, the formulation of which is borrowed from Roemer (1998) , building on earlier work by John Rawls, Amartya Sen and others, is well illustrated by the standard opposition between inequality and mobility. The US is often presented as more unequal than European societies but at the same time more mobile from a generation to the next, a feature which is sometimes taken as the sign of a more equal distribution of chances or opportunities in the US. 1 Despite the obvious importance of the concept of inequality of opportunities, limited empirical work has been done in this area, in comparison with the huge literature on the inequality of outcomes. 2 The main reasons for this scarcity are probably: (i) the conceptual difficulty of separating out 'circumstances ' and 'efforts'; and (ii) the limited availability of variables that could satisfactorily describe 'circumstances'. Both of these problems are still more acute in developing countries. Yet, knowing what part of observed outcome inequality may be attributed to circumstances, and in particular to family background, is as important there as in richer nations. Such knowledge should help define the actual scope for redistribution policies and, in particular, it should inform the choice between redistributing current income or expanding the opportunity sets of the poor, for instance through making the accumulation of human capital among children less dependent on their parents.
3 These issues are particularly relevant in the case of Brazil, because of its high level of (outcome) inequality. To what extent is this high inequality due to very unequal opportunities that individuals inherit from their parents and to what extent is it the result of some heterogeneity in their efforts, or in the returns to these efforts? Focusing on human capital and education, a natural way of answering this question consists of studying the 'demand for schooling' or, in other words, how much parents invest in their children, conditionally on their own characteristics. That part of schooling inequality which is explained by the characteristics of parents is then taken to quantify the inequality of opportunities, whereas the remainder is attributed to heterogeneous individual efforts. This approach has been followed by Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) for Latin American countries. Barros and Lam (1993) , and Lam (1999) applied similar methods to Brazil. Given the nature of their data sets, however, these studies focused on expected future mobility or, in other words, the relation between the potential earnings of children when they become adults, and the earnings of their parents. The approach was not suitable for disentangling the actual share of the inequality of opportunities in today's levels of overall (outcome) inequality.
We follow a different strategy, based on direct information given by survey respondents about the education and occupational position of their parents, as available in the 1996 Brazilian household survey (PNAD). It turns out that this information permits measuring not only the extent of intergenerational educational mobility but also the way in which parents' characteristics, and some other circumstance variables, affect the earnings or income of their children, independently of the education of the children. By controlling for the year of birth, it is also possible to see how this influence of parents and social background has changed across cohorts and whether opportunities account for an increasing or decreasing proportion of total inequality. Although we focus on parental education as a central determinant of opportunity, there are other dimensions in the space of opportunities, which can be captured by some of the variables in our data set. These include parental occupation, race, and the region of origin.
The analysis reveals a sizeable inequality of opportunities in Brazil. First, parental education proves to be a powerful independent determinant of individual earnings or income, even when controlling for the individual's own schooling. In addition, parental education is a strong predictor of own schooling. It turns out that, for older cohorts, the distribution of schooling is almost fully reproduced -up to some increase in average schooling -across generations. At the same time, the analysis also shows that the inequality that would remain among people after controlling for the inequality of all observed circumstances -parents' education, occupation, race and region of origin -is still very high: higher than the total inequality of outcomes observed in many countries in the world. This may be because: (i) important circumstances that shape the economic opportunities people face are simply unobserved or unobservable; and/or (ii) the functioning of the Brazilian economy is generates high inequality in individual efforts and/or in the returns to those efforts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the theoretical background for the estimation work undertaken in the paper, in terms of the general relationship between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunities. Section 2 discusses estimates of the effect of circumstance variables on both individual schooling and earning outcomes. Section 3 then presents a range of measures of the influence of the inequality of observed opportunities on the inequality of individual earnings. Section 4 generalizes this analysis to the case of household per capita incomes. This allows us to account for the role that circumstances may play in welfare inequality through labor-force participation behavior, assortative mating and fertility. The concluding section places the preceding results in an international perspective and draws some simple implications of these results for our understanding of anti-inequality policy in Brazil.
Conceptual background.
Among the determinants of the earnings of an active individual at any point in time, one can find some personal characteristics which are independent of the individual's will. Following Roemer (1998), we call such characteristics "circumstances", and contrast them to characteristics that, on the contrary, reflect "efforts" made by the individual to increase his/her productivity and earnings. Let C denote the set of "circumstance" variables and E denote the set of "effort" variables. C typically includes fixed socio-demographic attributes like race, sex, region of origin, and the individual's family background. E corresponds essentially to the human capital accumulated by the individual once he is free to make decisions for himself. This may include the last part of formal schooling, but also on-the-job training, past decisions to change job or region of residence, or current effort at work.
One could then represent the most general form of this relationship between earnings, efforts and circumstances as w i = f(C i , E i ). A first, possibly naïve, attempt to estimate such a relationship empirically would be to linearize the model as follows:
where w i denotes current hourly earnings, α and β are two vectors of coefficients and u i is a residual term that accounts for unobserved circumstance -including sheer luck -and effort variables, measurement error, and transitory departures from the permanent level of earnings. All of these factors are assumed to be independent of the variables included in C and E. They are also assumed to have zero mean and to be identically and independently distributed across individuals.
If inequality were to be measured by the variance of the logarithm of earnings, and if one could reasonably assume that circumstances and efforts are mutually independent, then the following simple decomposition of total inequality would hold:
where v( ) stands for variances and V( ) for variance-covariance matrices. In other words, total inequality could be explained simply as a weighted sum of the inequality of observed opportunities (first term on the RHS), the inequality of observed efforts (second term) and the inequality due to unobserved earning determinants.
But the formulation in (1) suffers from a number of obvious shortcomings. First, to assume complete additive separability between circumstances and efforts -and independence between all the unobservable and observable earning determinants -seems hopelessly inadequate. It seems natural, for instance, to allow for the possibility that efforts may themselves be partly determined 6 by circumstances, so that w i = f(C i , E i (C i )). Formal schooling, for example, may be determined at least in part by family background. This effect of parental background on the educational outcomes of the next generation may occur because more educated parents provide more "home inputs" into an "education production function", such as books, vocabulary and quality time spent on homework, but it may also reflect individual learning about the returns to effort, which may themselves depend on the circumstances -and indeed on the previous mobility history -of the family. 3 Assuming, more modestly, that only unobserved effort determinants are orthogonal to observed circumstances, we can write a system of equations for efforts as:
where b is a matrix of coefficients and v i stands for a vector of unobserved effort determinantsone component for each component of the vector E i . As usual the v i 's are supposed to be i.i.d.
across individuals and with zero mean. Substituting (3) into (1) yields:
This reduced-form expression shows that, if the world were reasonably represented by a model consisting of equation (1) and the system (3), circumstances have a double effect on wages. They affect it directly, for given efforts, through the set of coefficients α. They also affect it indirectly through their influence on efforts, the size of this second effect being given by the scalar product β.b. 4 This restatement of the original model modifies the variance decomposition in equation (2) and, more generally, any decomposition of the distribution of individual wages into components associated with observed circumstances and efforts. 3 Hanushek (1986) reviews the literature on the first, 'production function' view of the impact of family characteristics on individual schooling outcomes. Piketty (1995) models the second type of channel, where individual beliefs about opportunities and mobility are formed on the basis of the experience of their own lineages, and in turn rationally determine their own effort levels. Our empirical model allows for these indirect effects of circumstances (and past history) on welfare through efforts. It does not distinguish between the alternative channels, but it is consistent with both. 4 For a clear presentation of this distinction between direct and indirect effects of circumstances on current earnings see Bowles and Gintis (2002) .
If one were interested only on the total effect of circumstances on outcomes (measured by earnings), then an estimation of the reduced-form equation (4) would suffice. It would be impossible to identify the structural parameters α, β and b from the estimated coefficients, but it would be possible to treat those coefficients as capturing the combined effects of observed circumstances on outcomes. Indeed, the estimates of the complete effects of equalizing observed opportunities reported in section 3, and drawn in Figures 1-4 , correspond to those which would be obtained from a direct OLS estimation of equation (4). But the distinction between direct and indirect effects of circumstances on welfare may matter, not only because they are of intrinsic interest, but also because they have sharply different implications for policy.
The intrinsic interest of identification of the structural model arises largely from the (closely related) literature on intergenerational mobility, which has long struggled to understand the nature of the mechanisms through which parental education affects the earnings of children.
Particular interest has been attached to the relative magnitudes of the impact of the parents' education on the child's education, vis-à-vis the impact of the parents' education on the child's labor earnings conditional on own schooling. Given the relative importance of parental schooling within our set of circumstance variables, as will be shown below, our identification of the structural parameters in (1)-(3) has a bearing on that debate.
In addition, policymakers interested in reducing inequality of opportunities would benefit from knowing whether the effect of parental education on child's earnings operates predominantly through the direct effect (in which case, factors such as social network effects in access to employment and the importance of family wealth in establishing one's own business would be paramount) or largely through the effect on education (in which case the central policy challenge will lie in broadening access to continued schooling opportunities to children from disadvantaged backgrounds, through programs like cash transfers conditional on school attendance, or special after-class help for lagging students). Although a consideration of these specific policies lies outside the scope of this paper, the policy relevance of distinguishing direct and indirect effects of circumstances on outcomes lies behind our attempt to identify the structural model, rather than being satisfied with running an OLS regression of model (4). 5
Such a decomposition of the impact of circumstances into direct and indirect effects would only make sense, however, if one could find unbiased estimates of the various sets of coefficients: α, β and b. Running OLS on equations (1) and (3) is unlikely to yield such estimates. In particular, the required assumption that u in equation (1) is orthogonal to C and E may be open to doubt.
The problem is probably less serious for the circumstance variables. One may not be so much interested in the 'true' effect of the variables included in C but in their overall impact once their correlation with unobservable circumstances are taken into account. This overall impact will be truthfully described by the OLS estimate of α. In other words, if parental wealth or income is not observed, the estimate of α will account for the effect on children's earnings of both the variables in C and the effect of that part of parental wealth or income which is correlated with elements of C.
The real problem arises when unobservables (u) in the earnings equation cannot be assumed to be independent of the effort variables (E). Again, imagine that parental wealth has a direct impact on either the schooling or the current earnings of their children (or both), independently of the child's own education. This correlation between u and E, or u and v, introduces bias in the estimation of the (α,β) coefficients and therefore in the decomposition of the total inequality into circumstance and effort components.
One way out of this difficulty would be to observe instrumental variables, Z that would influence efforts but not earnings. Equation (3) would then be replaced by:
with the vector Z i being orthogonal to u i . Then instrumenting the effort variables in (1) through (5) would yield an unbiased estimator of (α,β) and then an unbiased decomposition of total inequality into inequality of observed opportunities, or circumstances, and inequality of efforts.
Models of this type have been extensively used in the literature on returns to education. In the standard Mincerian equation, for instance, instrumenting education by family background is standard practice to correct for the endogeneity of education. But if family background is an independent determinant of earnings in its own right, and indeed one is interested in separating out the impacts of the instrument and of the variable it is instrumenting for, as is presently the case, then some other instrument is required. Ability tests taken while attending school have sometimes been used. But that information is seldom available, particularly in developing countries. 6
In the absence of an adequate set of instrumental variables Z, the only solution is to explore the likely effect of the potential bias in the estimation of β due to the correlation between u and v, and then to decide on that basis what is the most reasonable range of estimates. This is the approach we adopt in this paper, relying on the parametric bounds analysis which is described in detail in the appendix.
Once this method yields an interval for the unbiased estimates of the parameters α, β and b, it simply remains to define our measure of inequality of opportunities, and its contribution to the distribution of current earnings. An appealing way of measuring that contribution consists of evaluating (through the system of equations (1) and (3)) the counterfactual distribution of earnings which would attain if all the inequality due to the circumstance variables had been eliminated. This can be done in two steps. First, one can derive from OLS estimates of equation (1) above what would be the distribution of earnings if circumstances had been equalized for all individuals. The remaining inequality would thus be due essentially to differences in efforts and in the residual term, u i . It is then possible to define hypothetical individual earnings:
where C stands for the mean circumstances in the population being studied and the notation ^ refers to OLS estimates of equation ( ..N } is only partial. Comparing the two approaches allows us to distinguish the part of the inequality of opportunities that goes through the direct effect of circumstances on outcomes, from 11 the part that goes through the effect of circumstances on efforts. This is why we report results from both the partial and complete estimates below.
Before closing this conceptual section, we note that when circumstance variables include parental characteristics, it is natural to think of the preceding analysis as being related to intergenerational mobility. A direct measure of income mobility would be provided by the preceding model if parents' income was among the variables C. But other types of mobility may be behind equation (3). For instance, if parental education is included in C and individuals' schooling is in E, then part of system (3) actually describes intergenerational educational mobility. The coefficient b that relates the education level of children to that of parents is an (inverse) indicator of that mobility.
For instance, if education is measured in number of years of schooling for both parents and children, then the extent to which b is less than unity would describe how fast differences in education tend to systematically lessen across generations. 8 It can be seen on equation (4) that the degree of intergenerational educational persistence, b, partly determines the share of current earnings inequality which is due to differences in circumstances or opportunities.
Earnings and educational mobility in Brazil
This method is now applied to Brazilian data. This section first describes the data and the nature of the variables being used. It then discusses the various estimates obtained both for the earnings equations and for the efforts equations. The latter can also be seen as describing intergenerational educational mobility in Brazil.
Data and variables
Data are from the 1996 wave of the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicilio (PNAD), the Brazilian Household Survey. For that year, information is available on the education and 12 occupation of the parents of all surveyed household heads and spouses. 9 The analysis is restricted to urban areas because of the general imprecision of earnings and income measurement in rural areas. 10 It is also restricted to individuals 26 to 60 years old, in an effort to concentrate on individuals having finished schooling and potentially active in the labor market. The analysis first focuses on individual earnings, measured as "real hourly earnings from all occupations". In a second stage, the analysis will be conducted for welfare levels, measured by household income per capita. This will allow us to discuss the roles of labor supply behavior and fertility as additional channels through which the inequality of opportunities affects the inequality of outcomes.
The vector of circumstance variables, C, includes race dummy variables, parental education expressed as numbers of years of schooling 11 , the occupational position of the father 12 -a 9-level categorical variable-and dummies for the regions of origin. The vector of effort variables, E, is 13 restricted to the individual schooling, measured in years 13 , years of schooling squared, to capture possible non-linearities, and a migration dummy, defined as whether the observed municipality of residence is different from the one where the individual was born. 14 Descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in Table 1 .
Earnings equations
Earnings equations were estimated separately for men and women, and by cohort, using OLS for men and the standard two-stage selection bias correction procedure for women 15 . Results are shown in Table 2 . Note that, unlike in the standard Mincerian specification, age or imputed experience do not appear among the regressors because we are treating cohorts as agehomogeneous by definition.
Circumstance variables have the expected effect on earnings. The coefficients of racial dummy variables are negative and significant for both blacks and 'pardos'. 16 They are generally positive, but not always significant for people with an Asian origin. It is interesting that the racial gap against blacks and 'pardos' is less pronounced for women. It is not even always significant.
Regional differences are important, too. With the South-East as a reference, being born in the North-East has a strong and significantly negative effect for both men and women. The effect of the other regions is generally also negative, but seldom significant. The estimated effect of mean parental education on individual earnings is always positive, significant, and relatively stable across cohorts. It is also sizable since it amounts to a 3 to 6 per cent increase in earnings, for each additional year of schooling of the parents. The difference between the education of the father and the mother is meant to detect a possible asymmetry in the role of the two parents. But no such asymmetry seems to be systematically present. Concerning the estimated effect of father's occupation on earnings, it is generally positive -the reference category being rural workersthough seldom significant across cohorts, once we control for education, except for selfemployed shopkeepers and employers. 17
Turning now to the vector of "effort" variables, own education has the usual positive and significant effect on earnings for men. This effect is decreasing as one considers younger male cohorts. This is consistent with the negative coefficient generally found for the squared imputed experience term -i.e. age minus number of years of schooling minus first schooling age -in the standard Mincerian specification. This implies that returns to schooling increase with age, which is exactly what is found here. 18 The coefficient of schooling is sometimes insignificant, particularly for women. The reason is that the overall education effect is captured by the squared years of schooling term, which is positive and significant both for men and women. This means that the marginal return to education increases with the number of years of schooling.
The order of magnitude obtained for the return to schooling in the preceding equations is somewhat lower than previous estimates for Brazil. For instance, Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999) found that the marginal return to a year of schooling lies in the range 12 to 15 percent for both men and women in 1999. In Table 2 , marginal returns at 5 years of schooling range from 7 to 11 percent for men and from 11 to 13 percent at 10 years of schooling. This may be due in part to the specification being used here, which is not strictly comparable to the Mincerian model. The difference is also consistent, however, with the probable over-estimation of the returns to schooling in an earnings equation that does not include family background variables. 19 17 In fact, we observed that all father's occupational categories are highly significant determinants of individuals' years of schooling in our effort equations described further on. Only self-employed and employers seem to be significant determinants of earnings, independently from education. 18 The conventional Mincerian specification is such that: Lnw = a.S + b.Exp -c.Exp² where Exp = Age -S -6. Expanding the Exp term leads to: Lnw = (a-b-12c).S + 2cAge.S -c.S 2 + terms in Age or Age squared. If this equation is estimated within groups with constant age, one should indeed observe that the coefficient of S is higher in older cohorts. Note that the present specification also includes an independent S 2 term. 19 The preceding intuition is fully confirmed by the data used in this study. In unreported regressions, though available from the authors upon request, we have re-estimated the preceding wage equation with years of schooling instrumented by parents' schooling achievements and the other exogenous variables of the model, and with parents' education excluded from the regressors. The coefficients of the number of years of schooling turn out to be substantially higher than in the previous case because they now partly account for the direct influence of parental education on individual earnings. Their order of magnitude is also comparable to what has been found in other earnings equations estimated for Brazil (see, for example, Ferreira and Paes de Barros, 1999 ).
Migration has a significant and positive effect on earnings, both for men and women. This sign would be consistent with a human capital interpretation of migration. Because the coefficient is rather large, amounting to a 10-18 per cent increase in earnings, it is tempting to consider this as an effort variable. But, it may also reflect the decision of parents to move to an area with better income opportunities when the surveyed individual was still a child, in which case this variable should be taken as indicative of circumstances. If this were true, however, the size of the estimated coefficients would suggest very much persistence in the earnings differential that might have motivated the migration of the parents. 20
Effort equations and intergenerational educational mobility
Let us now turn to estimates of equation (3), and consider the impact of circumstances on efforts (i.e. schooling and migration). Because no significant model for migration was found, this variable is dropped from the analysis. Regression results for schooling are shown in Tables 3a   and 3b separately for men and women. They call for several remarks.
The first set of remarks has to do with intergenerational educational mobility as measured, inversely, by the coefficient of parental education. The higher that coefficient, the stronger is parental education in determining the schooling of their children, and therefore the less mobility there is. Because education is measured for both parents and children in years of schooling, a unit value for that coefficient is a convenient reference. It would correspond to the perpetuation of differences in years of schooling across generations -this being consistent with an increase in mean schooling. Conversely, a coefficient less than unity means that educational differences tend to diminish across generations. From that point of view, a striking feature in tables 3a and 3b is that the coefficient of the mean schooling of parents is significantly below unity and has been decreasing continuously and significantly over time. An interesting feature of intergenerational educational mobility is that intra-household decision mechanisms seem to matter more for the education of women than for men. The transmission of education from parents to girls is higher, the greater the mother's schooling relative to the father's. This effect is significant and persistent across cohorts. For boys, however, although the mother's education still seems to weigh more than the father's, the difference is only significant for a single cohort. In both cases, it is difficult to find a trend in the evolution across cohorts.
A full understanding of the inequality of educational opportunities in Brazil would require a more detailed analysis. In particular, very much of the preceding discussion is based on measuring education in terms of the number of years of schooling. One might prefer a more general approach based on 'human capital' rather than years of schooling, where human capital might be measured by the cost of education, including forgone earnings, or possibly by the earnings that a would be natural.
given schooling level actually commands. Also, the quality of schooling is totally ignored in the preceding description of intergenerational educational mobility. However, it cannot be ruled out that taking into account the quality of education, so as to get closer again to a concept of human capital, would modify the preceding conclusion of an increasing educational mobility in Brazil. 21 Unfortunately, there is no data source in Brazil which combines information on plausible
measures of educational quality with information on the schooling of parents, for individuals currently active in the labor market.
Evaluating the inequality of opportunities and its influence on the inequality of earnings
The methodology presented in section 1 is now applied on the basis of the preceding earnings and effort equations. Making all variables in the analysis explicit, the two basic equations (1) and (3) now write:
where S is the number of years of schooling of the surveyed individual, S 2 the square of than number, and M his/her migrant status. R, GR, MPE, DPE and FO stand respectively for the race dummies, the regional dummies, mean parental schooling, the mother/father difference in schooling, and father occupation. α R , α G , b R , and b G are vectors of coefficients whereas other
Estimates of all these coefficients are partly shown in Tables 2 and 3 and they have been discussed extensively in the preceding section. In principle, there should be an equation like (9) for all effort variables appearing in equation (8), that is, for S, S² and M. However, the equation for S² necessarily leads to conclusions similar as (9) whereas it was not possible to identify any significant effect of the circumstance variables on the migration status, M.
Identifying the role played by the inequality of opportunities in the distribution of current earnings consists of equalizing the circumstance variables either in equation (8) -for the "partial" effect -or in both equation (8) and (9) As for circumstance variables that are intrinsically unobservable, they are by their very nature analytically and practically irrelevant for understanding the sources of inequality in Brazil. On the other hand, it may simply be the case that observed non-opportunity related earnings inequality is very high in Brazil, and presumably higher than in other countries. Possible reasons for this include structural characteristics of the labor market that would tend to magnify differences across people with the same observed background, or possibly a large variance of persistent and non-persistent shocks in the earning career of individuals.
A second important conclusion of the analysis is that the proportion, or even the absolute value of inequality due to observed opportunities in actual inequality seems rather stable across cohorts, regardless of whether the Gini or Theil coefficients are considered. This finding is consistent with 22 The fact that the bounds are close to each other for the complete effect and far apart for the partial effect is not really surprising. It may be seen from (7) that the estimation of the complete effect is in some sense equivalent to a reduced form model, where (log) earnings is a function of circumstances only. There would be no OLS bias in that case. This is in contrast with the partial effect model (6), where the coefficients may be strongly biased because of the endogeneity of efforts. 23 To check how income is correlated with education, occupation and region of origin in the current generationwhich is the best we can do -we ran a regression of income on these variables for the PNAD respondents with children. R-squares are in the range 0.31 -0.42, depending on the cohort. the idea that circumstances are essentially responsible for differences in the "starting point" of individual earnings. Later in the life-cycle, however, other factors are responsible for changes in inequality. The fact that both actual inequality and circumstance-corrected inequality increase in a parallel way with age is consistent with persistent circumstance-independent labor market shocks for active individuals. 24 On the basis of the increased intergenerational educational mobility discussed above, one might have expected to see the proportion of the inequality accounted for by opportunities fall, when moving from older to younger generations. That this is not the case may have several explanations. Two of them are as follows. First, the change in intergenerational educational mobility found in the education equations above may be too limited to have a significant effect on the inequality of earnings. Second, returns to education tend to be lower for the youngest generations, which somewhat compensates the equalizing effect of more intergenerational educational mobility.
Finally, it is interesting to evaluate the role of particular circumstance variables in the preceding results. The complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables is shown for the Gini coefficient on figures 3a and 3b -results are qualitatively analogous for the Theil coefficient. It can be seen there that, of all circumstance variables, parental education plays the largest role in determining inequality. Father's occupation is the second most important variable but, as it is correlated with education, its independent contribution is smaller than suggested by figures 3.
With respect to education, it is worth emphasizing that results are not very different when parental schooling is not equalized across the board, but instead a lower bound is imposed, as if schooling were compulsory until a certain age. This means that it is the inequality of education at the bottom of the distribution that really matters to explain the contribution of the inequality of opportunities to actual inequality in earnings. Interestingly enough, race alone seems to account for very little, when parental occupation and education are already controlled for. These results suggest that the most effective policies for reducing inequality of opportunities in Brazil would be those that reduced the effect of parental education on their child's schooling and earnings.
This conclusion is even stronger for women than for men. 21
The effects of the inequality of opportunities on the distribution of household income
The analysis so far has referred to the earnings of active individuals. The same type of analysis may also be conducted for economic welfare levels, whether the individuals are active or not.
Why should one rule out women who are out of the labor force from the measurement of the inequality of opportunities? That she is outside the labor force and has many children may well be a channel through which circumstance variables affect the economic welfare of an individual.
This section thus focuses on measuring the effect of the inequality of opportunities faced in the past by household heads and spouses on the distribution of economic welfare among them. The welfare measure used in this section is the monetary household income per capita. Thus each adult in the population -or more precisely: all household heads and spouses -is imputed a welfare level equal to income per capita in his/her household. With this new definition, the opportunities faced by household heads and spouses now affect not only their earnings, as before, but also their participation behavior, fertility, non-labor income and, of course, the matching of individuals within couples.
In an effort to capture these effects the previous model was re-estimated substituting household per capita income for earnings and considering the whole population of adults rather than earners only. In effect, three different models were estimated, with the objective of identifying various channels through which opportunities affect welfare: individual earnings, labor supply behavior, fertility, etc.. . In all cases, the welfare level of individual i is given by:
where m(i) is the household of which i is the head or the spouse, y jm(i) is the earnings of member j (=h for household head ,s for spouse), y 0m(i) is non-labor income -really, income on top of the earnings of h and s -and n m(i) is the number of persons in the household.
The first model generalizes directly the approach from the previous section. The earnings of each active member, h or s, is taken as a function of the circumstances and efforts of that person:
Evidence of this age-dependence of earnings inequality in other countries is analyzed in Deaton and Paxson (1994) .
The estimation is run only on individuals with positive earnings. The simulations are carried out as before by equalizing circumstances and re-computing earnings for all active persons. Then I I ) where Z i reasonably includes the circumstances and efforts of the two parents {C hm(i) , C sm(i) , E hm(i) , E sm(i) ,} and k = {2, 3, .., 7 and more) is family size.
The third model is completely reduced-form. We now simply regress the welfare level of individual i on circumstance and effort variables. But this income per capita naturally depends on the circumstances and efforts of both spouses since it incorporates the earnings of both. The model thus writes :
This estimation is run on two parent/adult households, whereas model (I) continues to apply to singles or single parent households.
Model (III) takes into account various channels through which the inequality of opportunities may affect the distribution of personal welfare. It does so in reduced-form, however, and it is thus impossible to disentangle them from just this model. Behind equation (III), is not only the way in which individual circumstances and efforts affect individual earnings, but also how they affect labor supply behavior, the presence of non-labor income, the matching of spouses, or fertility, since the household size is also present in the definition of the level of welfare.
Using these three models, the effect of equalizing the circumstances of household heads and spouses on the distribution of welfare may be simulated in various ways. Comparing these ways permits identifying some of the channels through which circumstances affect the distribution of welfare. Consider the three following simulations: It may be seen in Table 4 that the drop in inequality obtained from equalizing the effect of circumstances on earnings is approximately the same when considering the distribution of household income per capita as when analyzing individual earnings (in the previous section). In both cases, the Gini coefficient falls by some 8 to 10 percentage points, whereas the fall in the Theil coefficient for the distribution of welfare roughly corresponds to the average fall observed for male and female earnings inequality -see figures 1b and 2b. To the extent that potential earnings and family background tends to be positively and rather strongly correlated within couples, such a result was to be expected. Fertility is one of these phenomena and it has already been analyzed. Other channels through which equalizing circumstances may affect the distribution of welfare are labor supply, choice of partner, and non-labor income. Their effect may be gauged from comparing the 3 rd and 4 th block in table 4. These residual effects were largest for the oldest cohort. Indeed, they were responsible for a drop in the inequality of welfare among the oldest generations, but for an increase among the youngest. For the oldest cohorts, one may think that the incidence of retirement income may 25 play an important role. It has been shown in previous work that pensions are so regressive in Brazil that they do much to explain the excess in the country's inequality relative, say, to the United States -see Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002) . As these pensions are likely to go to individuals with favorable family circumstances, a large effect may indeed be expected through this channel for the oldest cohorts in the present sample. For the youngest cohorts the unequalizing effect of equalizing circumstances that goes through labor supply and non-labor income is more puzzling, even though it is limited in size.
A possible explanation would be the negative dependence of female participation on non-labor and male labor income. By equalizing circumstances, this income source is becoming smaller among the richest households and bigger among the poorest ones. If participation behavior depended only on current income and not independently on circumstances, it would follow that female participation would go up among the richest and down among the poorest. Thus equalizing circumstances would lead to more inequality on the participation account.
Even if this argument helps explain the results shown in Table 4 , the labor supply channel for the effect of equalizing circumstances is likely to be far more complicated than implicitly assumed here. First, circumstances may have a direct effect on participation, independently of income.
Second, potential earnings are also likely to be an important determinant of labor supply with the opposite effect of equalizing circumstances on inequality. Third, fertility behavior is also likely to affect labor supply, as mentioned above. For all these reasons, it would seem necessary to rely on a structural model that would include all these dimensions of behavior to fully understand the origin of the preceding effects. Doing so might also show that relying on pure monetary income to define welfare, as done here without any correction for labor supply, may not be satisfactory.
In summary, the role of the inequality of opportunities in shaping the distribution of household welfare is larger than in the case of individual earnings. If observed circumstances could be equalized, welfare inequality would go down by much more than earnings inequality. The drop in the Gini coefficient is around 12 percentage points for incomes and around 8 points for earnings.
As the arithmetic effect that goes through individual earnings in the case on welfare inequality is comparable in size to what was found for individual earnings, additional effects must be at work in the case of household income per capita. The simple simulations undertaken in this section suggest that household size and composition, labor force participation and non-labor income are important channels through which opportunities can affect the distribution of household income.
A precise identification of the contribution of each channel remains for future work. At this stage, only the household size channel has been shown to be potentially very important, particularly among younger households.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that inequality in Brazil remains very high even after equalizing observed circumstances holds in the case of the distribution of welfare, just as it did for individual earnings. When all effects are taken into account as in the bottom rows of Table 4 , equalizing circumstances still leaves a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.5. This is undoubtedly high by all international standards.
Summary and conclusion
This paper tried to quantify the role of the inequality of opportunities -associated with people's race, region of origin, the education and the occupation of their parents -in generating inequality in current earnings and incomes in Brazil. We estimated the impact of opportunities (or circumstances) both directly on earnings and incomes, and indirectly on the level of effortssuch as schooling -undertaken by individuals. We took account of the biases arising from the lack of adequate instruments for correcting for the endogeneity of some of the income determinants, by showing upper and lower bounds for the unbiased estimates, for plausible values of the bias.
Altogether, the inequality of observed opportunities is responsible for a very substantial proportion of total outcome inequality in Brazil. It accounts for approximately 8-10 percentage points of the Gini coefficient for individual earnings. Fifty-five to 75 percent of this share can be attributed to parental schooling alone, and 70 to 80 percent when the father's occupation is added.
The effect of opportunities is even higher for household income per capita, amounting to some 12 percentage points of the Gini (and even more for some cohorts). The reason for this difference with individual earnings is that opportunities affect welfare levels both through earnings and 27 through additional channels. This is true in particular of household size and composition and, probably to a lesser extent, of labor-force participation, non-labor income and assortative mating.
Although international comparisons of the intergenerational transmission of inequality are always difficult -because of differences in definition, methodology and data type -the preceding figures nevertheless look high by international standards. Table 5 shows that the share of the variance of Our finding that the degree of intergenerational educational persistence in Brazil is high by international standards is consistent with the results of two other recent studies which use the same PNAD data set we used: Dunn (2003) and Ferreira and Veloso (2003) . If anything, these studies find shares of variance in earnings (Dunn) and schooling (Ferreira and Veloso) accounted for by parental variables which are even higher than ours although, in both cases, this may be due to the estimation techniques employed. 25
The role played by inequality of observed opportunities in shaping the inequality of current earnings and incomes in Brazil is clearly important. The effects also appear to be larger than in other countries for which data is available. Yet, the inequality that they leave unexplained remains very substantial. In effect, correcting for observed disparities in opportunities would leave the Gini coefficient at 0.45 and above for individual earnings and 0.48 and above for income per capita, levels which are higher than total inequality in many countries, including those listed in Table 5 . Thus, although the inequality of opportunities in Brazil is important, the country would still rank high in an international comparison of inequality even after eliminating that particular source of inequality.
Figures 1 and 2 also indicated that both the direct and the indirect effects of circumstances on earnings are important, each in its own right. This suggests that policies aimed at equalizing opportunity may be warranted both inside and beyond the classroom. Parental education -and, to a lesser extent, occupation -do affect the length of children's school careers. Efforts to reduce this dependence, through conditional cash-based assistance to students and their families, or through after-school programs for students who may be falling behind, might well deserve consideration. But family background clearly also impacts on earnings directly, even after conditioning on own schooling. This is consistent with hypotheses that both employment and career advancement opportunities may be allocated in part through socially-based networks. 26 In this paper, we have not presented any evidence on the existence of such networks, or on their welfare properties, but further investigation of their operation in the Brazilian case is warranted, and may be relevant for the ongoing debate on affirmative action in Brazil.
Appendix: Taking into account the endogeneity of efforts and estimating bounds for the inequality of opportunities
The measure of the inequality of opportunities used in this paper depends on the estimates of the coefficients of the equation that explain earnings as a function of circumstances and efforts -i.e. equation (1). Because of the endogeneity of efforts and the absence of adequate exogenous instrument to deal with it, it is necessary to discuss the implications of the bias that this may imply for the estimates of the coefficients of the earning equation and therefore for the estimation of the inequality of opportunities. This appendix describes the method used to obtain 'bounds' on these estimates, which was inspired by the 'bounds analysis' developed by Manski and Pepper (2000) , in a different context.
Consider the model :
where it is assumed that the error term i u is not necessarily orthogonal to all explanatory variables in X. Assume without loss of generality that all the variables have zero mean and define the following covariance matrices:
The bias of OLS estimates of equation (i) is given by B in (ii):
where Xu ρ stands for the correlation coefficients between the components of Y and the residual term, u, and σ V is the standard error of variable V. Evaluating the bias vector B thus requires knowing σ u and Xu ρ . An unbiased estimator of σ u is readily obtained for any set of correlation coefficients Xu ρ . Indeed, it can be shown that :
σ is the variance of the OLS residuals. Substituting the value of the bias given in (ii) in that expression yields:
For any set of correlation coefficients Xu ρ , equations (ii)-(iv) thus permits computing the bias vector B and thus obtaining unbiased estimates of the coefficients of the model, β, and of the variance of the error term. As these correlation coefficients are not known, the idea is to use Monte-Carlo methods: we draw randomly a large number of values for them and derive bounds for the estimates of coefficients β, as well as for the results of the micro-simulation exercises undertaken in this paper, on the basis of these coefficients.
An important point is that not all vectors of correlation coefficients Xu ρ are possible, which contributes to reducing the size of the bounds. In practical terms, some components of Xu ρ are constrained to be zero -in this paper we have assumed that the residual term u is orthogonal to circumstances in equation (1) -while the others are drawn independently from a uniform distribution defined on (-1, 1). The correlation coefficient vector Xu ρ must satisfy the condition that the covariance matrix Σ be positive. All drawings such that this condition is not satisfied have been deleted.
We used a set of 300 valid drawings for each simulation leading to an estimation of the inequality of opportunities. Figures 1-3 in the text report the mean and extreme values in the set of 300 results obtained for each calculation. To the extent that these extreme values do not depend on any specific assumptions on the correlation between the explanatory variables and the residual term, they appear as 'natural bounds' for the analysis of the inequality of opportunities. As the distance between them turned out to be rather limited, it did not seem necessary to impose further arbitrary restrictions on the correlation coefficient vector, Xu ρ , as in bounds analysis (see, for instance, Manski and Pepper, 2000) . 
